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American courts confront questions of religious law in family disputes 
and other cases involving matters such as contracts, torts, or the use of 
private arbitration tribunals for dispute resolution.  In each of these areas, 
secular courts must endeavor to strike a constitutional balance between free 
exercise and establishment concerns when disputants present their 
controversies, claims, or evidence to the court.  Adherents of religious law 
face the corresponding challenge of determining how and when to invoke 
secular legal authority in their private disputes.  But religious family law 
practices provoke particularly intense and polarized debate in the United 
States and other nations.  
For the most part, we consider family matters to be located within a 
zone of privacy, unless there are harms to family members that the state 
must address.1  Individuals may choose to govern their lives through norms 
of religious law, even when these have no secular legal effect.2  For those 
public rights and obligations that depend on personal or family status, 
 
 *  Prepared for the Association of American Law Schools’ Sections on Islamic Law and Jewish 
Law Joint Program on “Islamic and Jewish Law in the 21st Century: Contemporary Philosophical 
and Legal Challenges to Religious Law,” January 5, 2014.   
 1.  On marital privacy, see for example Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 2.  See Ann Laquer Estin, Unofficial Family Law, 94 IOWA L. REV. 449 (2009); see also JULIE 
MACFARLANE, ISLAMIC DIVORCE IN NORTH AMERICA: A SHARI’A PATH IN A SECULAR SOCIETY 
(2012) (discussing use of parallel civil and religious divorce procedures).  For a notable decision 
affirming this practice, see Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
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however, the state maintains a monopoly over the legal definition of spousal 
or parent-child relationships.  In this public sphere, questions of marriage 
validity, divorce recognition and parentage determination become important 
for purposes of criminal law, creditor’s rights, bankruptcy, income tax, 
inheritance, Social Security benefits, immigration and many other subjects.  
As a family law scholar, I believe that the goals of secular and religious 
family law are often harmonious, and I have argued for a legal pluralism in 
the United States that is subject to the constraints of our fundamental 
“political and constitutional values, [including principles] of equality, 
nondiscrimination, [due process,] and religious freedom . . . as well as the 
protective policies that form the foundation for our particular rules of family 
law.”3  This vision of pluralism seeks to accommodate diverse cultural and 
religious traditions within our secular legal system, and rejects an approach 
in which autonomous religious institutions exercise independent authority 
over family law matters.4  This approach “reflects a contemporary 
understanding of our society as a diverse and multicultural one, and of the 
family as central to the establishment of identity and meaning in private 
life.”5  My writing has explored the process in which common law courts 
adjudicating these cases have begun to develop principles defining the terms 
and limits for accommodation of religious family practices,6 and I have 
followed with interest as many judges and scholars in the United States and 
other countries have made thoughtful contributions to this dialogue.7   
The debate over multicultural accommodation and fundamental values 
has taken a new direction since 2010, with the enactment of legislation in 
several states designed to constrain the process through which courts 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Embracing Tradition: Pluralism in American Family Law, 63 
MD. L. REV. 540, 541 (2004).  It would also be subject to constraints of criminal law and the public 
child welfare system.  See id. at 568 n. 169. 
 4.  On the definitional and membership problems associated with formal legal pluralism, see 
Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law, Pluralism, and Human Rights, 25 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 811, 824-27 
(2011). 
 5.  Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 541. 
 6.  In addition to the other articles previously cited, see also The Multi-Cultural Family (Ann 
Laquer Estin, ed. 2008), Ann Laquer Estin, Toward a Multicultural Family Law, 38 FAM. L.Q. 501 
(2004) 
 7.  See The Multi-Cultural Family, supra note 6, see also MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A 
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND 
RELIGION (Joel A. Nichols, ed. 2012).  
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evaluate relevant principles of religious law.8  At the outset, these proposals 
were framed to prohibit any consideration of Sharia law, until the federal 
courts ruled that the Oklahoma ballot initiative taking this approach violated 
the Establishment Clause.9  More recent statutes apply more broadly to any 
“foreign law,”10 and seek to control state courts’ consideration of “foreign 
law” by two techniques: (1) restricting the use of traditional common law 
principles of comity and forum non conveniens,11 and (2) limiting the 
enforcement of contractual choice of law and forum selection agreements.12  
In their campaign to enact these laws, the proponents have focused on 
family law, tempering the sweeping language of their legislation with 
exemptions for contracts entered into by corporations or other business 
entities,13 or directing the new restrictions exclusively to family law.14  It is 
not evident how or whether the new statutes will lead to different outcomes 
in family disputes.  The proponents pointed to examples of cases in which 
state courts considered a claim or evidence based on religious law or 
practice,15 but the same examples suggest that courts were able to handle 
these issues appropriately.16  There is reason for concern, however, that the 
 
 8.  An argument for this type of legislation is advanced by Shariah Law and American State 
Courts: An Assessment of State Appellate Court Cases, CTR. FOR SEC. POLICY (May 20, 2011), 
available at http://shariahinamericancourts.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/Sharia_Law_And_ 
American_State_Courts_1.4_06212011.pdf; see also Andrea Elliott, The Man Behind the Anti-
Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/ 
us/31shariah.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  For arguments against enactment of  this legislation, see 
Faiza Patel et al., CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, Foreign Law Bans: Legal Uncertainties and Practical 
Problems (May 23, 2013), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/ 
publications/ForeignLawBans.pdf; Salli A. Swartz, ABA, Resolution and Report 113A (Aug. 8–9, 
2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/2011_am_ 
113a.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 9.  See Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 10.  Accord KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5102 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 20-15-101 (LEXIS through 2013 First Reg. Sess.). 
 11.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5103, 60-5105(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.). 
 12.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-5104, 60-5105(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.). 
 13.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5108 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 20-15-105 (LEXIS through 2013 First Reg. Sess.). 
 14.  Patel et al., supra note 8, at 5–6, 28–29, 50 n.19, 56 n.158; see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-
87.14 (LEXIS through 2013 Sess.). 
 15.  See Shariah Law and American State Courts, supra note 8, at 29–42 (listing “Top 20 
Cases”). 
 16.  See Patel et al., supra note 8, at 6–7 (rebutting the argument related to the “Top 20” cases). 
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more extreme form of these statutes will do serious harm to the ordinary 
practices of international comity in transnational family law cases.17 
In some formulations—as enacted in states such as Arizona, Louisiana, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee—the new foreign law statutes seem designed 
to reaffirm the well-established principle that courts may not enforce a 
foreign law “if doing so would violate a right guaranteed by the [state or 
federal] Constitution . . . or conflict with the laws of the United States or this 
state.”18  In states such as Kansas and Oklahoma, the statutory language is 
much more sweeping.  Kansas prohibits any ruling based,  
in whole or in part on any foreign law, legal code or system that 
would not grant the parties affected by the ruling or decision the 
same fundamental liberties, rights and privileges granted under the 
United States and Kansas constitutions, including, but not limited 
to, equal protection, due process, free exercise of religion, freedom 
of speech or press, and any right of privacy or marriage.19   
This seems to require a broad comparative constitutional law inquiry, in 
every choice of law or comity case, to determine whether the nation 
concerned has protections that are identical to those in Kansas.20  
With this essay, my goal is not to critique or interpret the new foreign 
law statutes.21  Rather, I intend to trace the contours of comity and 
 
 17.  See Ayelet Shachar, Faith in Law? Diffusing Tensions Between Diversity and Equality, in 
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE 
BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 7, at 341, 346–49.  There are also many 
other reasons to object to these laws, including their potential to increase the vulnerability of some 
family members in religious minority communities.  See id. 
 18.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-3103 (Westlaw through First Special Sessions of the Fifty-first 
Legis.); see La. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6001 (Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); see also N.C. Gen. Stat § 1-
87.14 (LEXIS through 2013 Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-15-102 (LEXIS through 2013 First Reg. 
Sess.).  For the principle that courts in the United States cannot recognize and enforce foreign 
judgments that violate our public policy or due process norms, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW section 482 (1987).  On the interpretation problems that may arise under 
these statutes, see Patel et al., supra note 8, at 15–24; see also Swartz, supra note 8, at 9–11 (arguing 
that “existing law already provides adequate protections”). 
 19.  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-5103 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); see also OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, § 20(B) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.) (same). 
 20.  See Patel et al., supra note 8, at 15–17.  
 21.  In addition to Patel et al., supra note 8, see generally Aaron Fellmeth, U.S. State Legislation 
to Limit Use of International and Foreign Law, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 107 (2012); Carlo A. Pedrioli, 
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constitutional law more generally, noting the circumstances in which courts 
deciding family law matters under ordinary comity or contract principles 
might refuse to apply foreign or religious law, or to recognize and enforce a 
judgment or arbitral award.  From a constitutional perspective, the important 
questions involve procedural and substantive protections for family rights 
under the Due Process Clause, equality and nondiscrimination arguments 
under the Equal Protection Clause, and religious freedom protected by the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.  
Constitutional doctrines provide the clearest possible threshold 
definition of both due process and public policy, and provide a useful lens 
for examining the types of concerns that courts might have in deciding these 
cases.  In my view, state courts have generally done a good job using 
comity, contract, and the Constitution to manage cases involving foreign and 
religious family law.  The most difficult cases they face are problematic, not 
because they reference foreign or religious law, but because they involve 
transnational families with ongoing ties to multiple countries and legal 
systems.  This presents a conceptual problem, which is not clearly addressed 
in these cases, regarding how we should define and understand the meaning 
of membership in our broader legal and political community. 
I.  COMITY, CONTRACTS, AND DUE PROCESS 
Most discussions of international comity in the United States begin with 
Hilton v. Guyot,22 which suggested that foreign country court judgments 
meeting basic requirements of reliability and fairness should be given legal 
effect, but also that a court asked to extend comity has discretion in making 
this determination.23  Contemporary formulations of the Hilton principle 
 
Constructing the Other: U.S. Muslims, Anti-Sharia Law, and the Constitutional Consequences of 
Volatile Intercultural Rhetoric, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 65 (2012); Ryan H. Boyer, Comment, 
“Unveiling” Kansas’s Ban on Application of Foreign Law, 61 U. KAN. L. REV. 1061 (2013); Sarah 
M. Fallon, Note, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and Maintaining Comity Within 
American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 153 (2013); Bradford J. Kelley, Comment, 
Bad Moon Rising: The Sharia Law Bans, 73 LA. L. REV. 601 (2013). 
 22.  159 U.S. 113 (1895).  
 23.  See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 8–11 (1991).  
Contemporary formulations of the comity principle follow this broad approach.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–82; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 98 (1971). 
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enumerate similar requirements—including, whether “the judgment was 
rendered [by] . . . a judicial system that . . . provide[s] impartial tribunals 
[and] . . . procedures compatible with due process of law;” whether the 
foreign court had an appropriate basis for exercising “jurisdiction over the 
defendant;” and whether the defendant had notice and an opportunity for a 
hearing.24  As part of the discretion accorded by the comity doctrine, states 
may deny recognition to foreign judgments based on a “strong public 
policy” that “would have precluded recovery” if the matter had been tried in 
its own courts.25   
State courts determining whether to extend comity to foreign judgments 
in family law cases generally apply the same requirements developed in 
interstate cases decided under the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.26  These requirements primarily concern jurisdictional 
grounds and the question of notice and an opportunity for a hearing.27 
Similarly, in cases involving marital agreements concluded abroad, state 
courts may apply their own laws to determine how and whether the 
agreement should be enforced.28    
For divorce, the rule in the United States is that jurisdiction must be 
based on the residence or domicile of one of the parties in the forum state.29  
This principle has a long history in the context of migratory interstate 
divorces as well as international cases.30  Courts deny comity to a divorce 
obtained abroad by a petitioner living with his or her spouse in the United 
States, even if the foreign court had a basis for jurisdiction, such as 
 
 24.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482. 
 25.  Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 98 cmt. g, 117 cmt. c.  
 26.  See generally ANN LAQUER ESTIN, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW DESK BOOK, 14–15 
(2012) [hereafter ABA DESK BOOK] (discussing comity). 
 27.  Id. at 6; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 484 (Recognition 
of Foreign Divorce Decrees); id. § 485 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Child Custody 
Orders); id. § 486 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Support Orders).  Courts may extend 
comity to orders of foreign religious tribunals, but only if those orders have civil legal effect in the 
country where they were issued.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 484–
86. 
 28.  E.g., Shaban v. Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863, 865 (Ct. App. 2001); Atassi v. Atassi, 451 
S.E.2d 371, 373–74, 376 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); see also ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 81–83. 
 29.  See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 385–86 (2007). 
 30.  See id. 
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nationality, that was sufficient under its own law.31 Personal jurisdiction is 
not required to litigate personal status matters in the United States—
including dissolution of marriage32 and termination of parental rights.33  It is 
necessary for litigation of the financial aspects of divorce,34 however, and 
also for establishing parentage and determining child support.35  This 
practice has been described as divisible divorce jurisdiction. Courts apply 
the same principles to international matters, both under the doctrine of 
comity and the more specific formulations of statutes—such as the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) and the Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA).36  Constitutional due process 
norms also require notice and an opportunity for a hearing in family law 
cases even—or especially—when personal jurisdiction is not mandatory.37  
Courts apply the same rule in international cases, denying comity to custody 
and divorce orders entered by foreign tribunals that failed to provide the 
respondent with notice and an opportunity for a hearing.38  
In a significant group of cases, state courts have refused comity to 
orders of foreign religious tribunals exercising official authority that was not 
consistent with United States due process norms.39  Following the divisible 
 
 31.  See, e.g., In re Ramadan, 891 A.2d 1186, 1190 (N.H. 2006), Farag v. Farag, 772 N.Y.S.2d 
368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 484 
(Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Divorce Decrees); see also ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 
26, at 62 nn.87–89. 
 32.  See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734–35 (1877); see also Williams v. North Carolina, 317 
U.S. 287, 298–99 (1942). 
 33.  See, e.g., Utah ex rel. W.A., 63 P.3d 607, 613–17 (Utah 2002); In re R.W., 39 A.3d 682, 693 
(Vt. 2011); see also UNIF. CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION & ENFORCEMENT ACT (UCCJEA) § 
201(c), 9 U.L.A. 23–24 (1997).  
 34.  See Kulko v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948). 
 35.  See Kulko, 436 U.S. 84; see also UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY SUPPORT ACT (UIFSA) § 
201, 9 U.L.A. (Part 1B) 235 (1999 & Supp. 2012). 
 36.  See ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 92–93 (financial aspects of divorce); id. at 145–53 
(parental responsibilities); id. at 228–37 (child support).  See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 485 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Child Custody Orders) 
(1987); id. § 486 (Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Support Orders).  
 37.  See ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 6; see also Ann Laquer Estin, Global Child 
Welfare: The Challenges for Family Law, 63 OKLA. L. REV. 691, 696–701 (2011). 
 38.  E.g., Seewald v. Seewald, 22 P.3d 580, 584–85 (Colo. App. 2001); see ABA DESK BOOK, 
supra note 26, at 62 nn.90–91. 
 39.  E.g., Tal v. Tal, 601 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993); Atassi v. Atassi, 451 S.E.2d 371 
(N.C. Ct. App. 1995). 
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divorce principle, courts have been most concerned with orders that address 
financial and custody issues, and their analysis often blends public policy 
and due process considerations. 
States have taken different positions as to whether and when foreign 
judgments, based on different substantive legal standards, may be said to 
violate a strong public policy for comity purposes. This claim has not 
generally been successful with financial orders,40 but state courts do require 
that foreign child custody orders must be based on a consideration of the 
best interests of the child.41  Although courts apply this principle universally, 
they reach different conclusions on whether to make an independent 
determination of the child’s best interests when asked to give effect to a 
foreign court’s order.42 
Beyond the realm of international comity, arbitration by Jewish or 
Islamic tribunals located within the United States has also been a flash point 
in controversies over the use of religious law.43  Because all arbitration is 
based on an agreement between the parties, the protections are primarily 
contractual, with state or federal arbitration statutes setting the terms for 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  Statutory or common law public policy 
norms define circumstances in which arbitration agreements should not be 
enforced, and the Supreme Court has consistently declined to extend 
constitutional due process into the realm of arbitration procedures.44  In 
family arbitration, within the scope of statutes based on the Uniform 
 
 40.  See, e.g., Leitch v. Leitch, 382 N.W.2d 448, 450 (Iowa 1986); Dart v. Dart, 568 N.W.2d 
353, 356–57 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997). 
 41.  See, e.g., Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So.2d 75, 84–85 (La. 2001); Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996); Oehl v. Oehl, 272 S.E.2d 441, 443–44 (Va. 1980).  See generally ABA 
DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 146–47. 
 42.  See ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 14–15.  Note that this question is now typically 
addressed under UCCJEA § 105(c), 9 U.L.A. 13–14 (1997).  See, e.g., Dyce v. Christie, 17 So.3d 
892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 43.  The broad questions in this area have been well explored in the legal literature.  See, e.g., 
Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 580–86; Unofficial Family Law, supra note 2, at 465–70; 
Michael A. Helfand, Religious Arbitration and the New Multiculturalism: Negotiating Conflicting 
Legal Orders, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1231 (2011).  For an empirical research study addressing Muslim 
dispute resolution in divorce, see MACFARLANE, supra note 2, at 155–61. 
 44.  For example, arbitration agreements may allow parties to obtain forms of relief that would 
otherwise be unavailable.  E.g. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) 
(recovery of punitive damages).  For a critique, see Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: 
What Process Is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 281 (2002). 
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Arbitration Act,45 courts have addressed problems of duress and 
unconscionability in the agreement to arbitrate,46 and have defined some 
subjects—particularly child custody disputes—as subject to different 
standards of review.47  When faced with agreements to arbitrate before 
religious tribunals, family law courts in the United States apply these neutral 
principles of arbitration and contract law.48 
Public policies applied to contract enforcement are also important in the 
context of marital agreements, which have been another flash point in the 
debate over foreign and religious family law.49  Some opponents of the 
foreign law bans have argued that the constitutional norms here should be 
construed in the other direction, to favor enforcement under the Contracts 
Clause.50  Current doctrine permits the states to regulate contracts when there 
is a “significant and legitimate public purpose,”51 which gives the courts 
wide latitude for the types of scrutiny typically applied to premarital or 
separation agreements.52  It is much less clear that a complete ban on 
enforcement serves a purpose.   
State courts applying the comity doctrine, working with the familiar 
procedural due process parameters of the United States Constitution and 
other generally applicable statutory and public policy norms, have been 
readily able to evaluate requests to recognize or enforce court judgments, 
 
 45.  UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT, 7 U.L.A. 1 (2000). 
 46.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 584–85.  
 47.  See, e.g., Fawzy v. Fawzy, 973 A.2d 347 (N.J. 2009) (custody arbitration award enforceable, 
unless there is threat of harm to child); Miller v. Miller, 620 A.2d 1161 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) 
(custody arbitration award may be enforced, unless it is contrary to the best interests of the children).  
Other states refuse to enforce agreements to arbitrate child custody matters.  See, e.g., Kovacs v. 
Kovacs, 633 A.2d 425 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Glauber v. Glauber, 600 N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1993); Kelm v. Kelm, 749 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio 2001); Tuetken v. Tuetken, 320 S.W.3d 262 
(Tenn. 2010).  For a critique of this stance, see Jeffrey Haberman, Child Custody: Don’t Worry, a 
Bet Din Can Get It Right, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 613 (2010).  Note that some states 
address arbitration of custody or child support matters by statute.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 600.5080 (West, Westlaw through 2014 Sess.); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 802.12(3) (West, Westlaw 
through 2013). 
 48.  See, e.g., Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011); see also infra notes 94–11 
and accompanying text. 
 49.  See generally Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 569–77.  
 50.  See Patel et al., supra note 8, at 23–24.  See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 
(Contracts Clause).   
 51.  See Energy Reserves Grp. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411–13 (1983). 
 52.  See generally ABA DESK BOOK, supra note 26, at 79–83.  
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arbitration orders, or marital agreements based on foreign or religious law. 
There are strong arguments for extending comity to foreign marriages and 
divorces, to protect the parties’ reasonable expectations and avoid situations 
in which a marriage is treated as valid and continuing in some places and not 
in others. With respect to the ancillary consequences of marriage and 
divorce—including financial matters and parental responsibility questions—
there are strong reasons to encourage private dispute resolution in its many 
forms.  Both of these conclusions also follow from the traditional view that 
family relationships deserve a degree of deference and protection from state 
interference. 
II.  PUBLIC POLICY AND FUNDAMENTAL FAMILY RIGHTS 
Exercising the discretion accorded by the comity doctrine, states may 
refuse recognition to a foreign law or judgment based on a strong public 
policy that would have precluded recovery if the matter had been tried in its 
own courts.53  For courts in the United States, there should be no doubt that 
comity is already subject  to the substantive protections for marriage and 
divorce, parental decision-making, and the termination of parental rights that 
the Supreme Court has identified under the Due Process Clause.  Just as a 
court judgment violating due process principles would not be entitled to Full 
Faith and Credit or comity, a judgment that infringed an individual’s 
fundamental rights should not be enforced in either a domestic or 
aninternational case. A significant body of case law explores the contours of 
these rights.  
Supreme Court decisions have repeatedly identified the right to marry as 
a fundamental right.54  In Turner v. Safley, in a context that triggered a lower 
level of scrutiny, the Court acted unanimously to invalidate regulations 
limiting prisoners’ ability to marry, on the basis that the restriction was “not 
reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”55  Writing for the 
 
 53.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(2)(d) and cmt. f (1987); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 98 cmt. g, 117 cmt. c (1971).  In family law, the 
public policy exception requires something more than different grounds for divorce or approaches to 
division of marital assets.   
 54.  Accord Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383–87 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967).   
 55.  Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99 (1987). 
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Court, Justice O’Connor noted that “inmate marriages, like others, are 
expressions of emotional support and public commitment;” that “the 
commitment of marriage may be an exercise of religious faith as well as an 
expression of personal dedication;” and that “marital status often is a 
precondition to the receipt of government benefits (e.g., Social Security 
benefits), property rights (e.g., tenancy by the entirety, inheritance rights), 
and other, less tangible benefits (e.g., legitimation of children born out of 
wedlock).”56  When faced with due process claims regarding marital 
dissolution, the Court has conceptualized divorce as a counterpoint to 
marriage: “the adjustment of a fundamental human relationship.”57   
Viewing marriage and divorce as fundamental rights, the constitutional 
arguments seem to line up against the foreign law bans.  To the extent that 
proponents of these bans reference practices such as polygamy, child 
marriage, and divorce by repudiation, these are already prohibited by state 
laws.58  Rules that deny legal recognition of foreign marriages or divorces 
risk depriving individuals of the many basic and important rights that depend 
on family status, and should, accordingly, be justified by some compelling 
governmental interest.  Based on cases such as Turner, it seems unlikely that 
the generalized fears behind the foreign laws bans could meet this standard.59  
Parent-child relationships also give rise to fundamental rights,60 but 
these are balanced against the state’s compelling interest in protecting 
children from harm.61  The Supreme Court requires special protections for 
parents in cases involving termination of parental rights,62 and deference to a 
fit parent’s decision-making regarding her child’s visits with extended 
family members.63  The Supreme Court has been more ambivalent in its 
 
 56.  Id. at 95–96. 
 57.  Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971); cf. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).  
See generally Family Law Federalism, supra note 29, at 424–28. 
 58.  See generally Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 567–69. 
 59.  See also Patel et al., supra note 8. 
 60.  E.g., Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923). 
 61.  See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164–70 (1944).  Given this balancing act, the 
Supreme Court’s more recent decisions are best characterized as imposing an intermediate level of 
scrutiny.  See David D. Meyer, The Constitutional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1461 (2006). 
 62.  See e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).  
 63.  Accord Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
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protection of the parental rights for unwed fathers,64 and courts have 
generally declined to extend the “fundamental rights” framework to custody 
litigation between a child’s parents.65  As a constitutional matter, therefore, 
the best interests of the child test provides sufficient protection, except in 
cases that also involve claims of discrimination based on race or gender.  
In general, therefore, fundamental parental rights are not undermined by 
the usual comity analysis, which asks whether the tribunal entered an order 
consistent with the best interests of the child.  For a custody determination 
made by a foreign court or religious arbitration tribunal, however, there are 
other concerns—particularly when the other legal system draws substantive 
or procedural distinctions between the parental rights of fathers and mothers.  
Similarly, laws that base child custody or support rights on race, religion, or 
birth status would trigger serious constitutional equality questions. 
III.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE FAMILY 
The prohibition of laws or practices that discriminate on the basis of 
race or other protected grounds—such as religion or national origin—stands 
at the core of equal protection.  Laws barring interracial marriages have been 
unconstitutional throughout the country since Loving v. Virginia,66 and the 
Supreme Court concluded in Palmore v. Sidoti that a child custody 
determination based on the race of the parties was similarly 
unconstitutional.67  A judgment based explicitly on the parties’ race or 
ethnicity would clearly be unenforceable in the United States.68 
Classifications based on gender were once pervasive in American family 
law, with its roots in the English ecclesiastical and common law, including 
the law of marriage, divorce, family property and parental rights and 
responsibilities. Similar principles were carried over into the emerging 
public structures that regulate and support families, such as federal income 
 
 64.  Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), and Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 
(1979), with Lehr v. Robertsen, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), and Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). 
 65.  Cf. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 3 (2004) (rejecting noncustodial 
parent’s assertion of fundamental parental right to determine child’s schooling).  See generally 
Meyer, supra note 61 (discussing noncustodial parents’ rights). 
 66.  388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
 67.  466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
 68.  Rulings based on religious considerations or membership would more likely be treated as 
raising First Amendment questions.  See infra Part IV. 
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tax and the Social Security program. Since the 1970s, however, the Supreme 
Court has required that legislative classifications based on gender or marital 
status have a direct and substantial relationship to some important 
governmental purpose, and may not simply reflect “mechanical application 
of traditional, often inaccurate assumptions about the proper roles of men 
and women.”69  In family law, these rulings have required that husbands and 
wives have the same rights with regard to alimony,70 that sons and daughters 
have the same rights to financial support,71 and that fathers and mothers have 
the same parental rights with respect to children they have both raised.72  
Given the distinct legal positions of husbands and wives under Jewish 
and Islamic law, gender inequality has been the central issue for courts and 
commentators debating family law pluralism.73 Their concern is that women 
face religious and communal pressure to agree to procedural and substantive 
rules that will be unfair in comparison to what the secular law provides.74 
Women who wish to live their lives according to different moral or religious 
principles, clearly have a right to forego other legal remedies that might 
otherwise be available. When couples bring their agreements or arbitration 
awards to secular courts as the basis for obtaining a civil divorce decree, 
however, those courts appropriately consider claims of unfairness—
including claims of gender bias.75 
Equality principles have also led the Supreme Court to strike most 
statutes that discriminate between children born to married or unmarried 
parents, insuring for example that they must have the same rights to parental 
 
 69.  Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 (1982).  
 70.  Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (striking Alabama statute under which husbands, but not 
wives, could be ordered to pay alimony). 
 71.  Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 17–18 (1975) (striking Utah statute under which girls 
reached majority at 18 and boys at 21). 
 72.  Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).  But see Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001) 
(sustaining federal statute making it more difficult for child born abroad to claim United States 
citizenship through an unmarried father than an unmarried mother).  Many cases have explored the 
rights of unmarried fathers, starting with Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).   
 73.  E.g., Linda C. McClain, Marriage Pluralism in the United States: On Civil and Religious 
Jurisdiction and the Demands of Equal Citizenship, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A 
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND 
RELIGION, supra note 7, at 309; Shachar, supra note 17; Julia Halloran McLaughlin, Taking Religion 
Out of Civil Divorce, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 395 (2013). 
 74.  Accord Shachar, supra note 17, at 354. 
 75.  See, e.g., Aleem v. Aleem, 947 A.2d 489, 501–02 (Md. 2008). 
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support.76  This presents a notable conflict with religious legal systems, 
which generally refuse to recognize father–child relationships formed 
outside the marital context. 
IV.  FAMILIES AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The most difficult challenges for secular state courts faced with 
questions of religious law or practice arise under the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses.  While the constitutional text has been understood to 
protect minority religious beliefs, the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reynolds v. 
United States rejected the claim that religious practices such as polygamy 
should be protected.77  Contemporary doctrine holds that states cannot target 
or prefer a particular religion, but may enact laws that are neutral and 
generally applicable—even if these constrain or penalize religious 
practices.78 
The neutrality requirement does important work in marriage law.  To the 
extent that secular American family laws recognize the authority of religious 
clergy or groups to solemnize marriages, all clergy or groups must have the 
same authority.79  If some premarital or marital agreements are enforced by 
the courts, marital agreements that include religious terms should also be 
enforced—subject to scrutiny based on the same neutral and general 
principles applied to similar agreements with no religious terms.  When 
presented with agreements for mahr, for example, state courts appropriately 
consider contract defenses—including, rules of procedural and substantive 
unconscionability.80  One important aspect of the Supreme Court’s First 
Amendment doctrine is that the state governments should avoid making 
 
 76.  E.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Levy v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1971).  Here as well, the Court has applied intermediate scrutiny, see 
Nguyenv. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 60 (2001).  
 77.  98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 78.  See, e.g., Emp’t. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990); cf. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 
2013) (holding that facially neutral polygamous cohabitation law was not neutral in application and 
enforcement).  Applying this framework, the direct ban on reference to sharia law was clearly 
unconstitutional, because it targeted a particular religion.  See supra note 9, and accompanying text. 
 79.  See, e.g., Persad v. Balram, 724 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001). 
 80.  E.g., Odatalla v. Odatalla, 810 A.2d 93 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2002); see Nathan B. 
Oman, How to Judge Shari’a Contracts: A Guide to Islamic Marriage Agreements in American 
Courts, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 287 (2011); see also Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 569–90. 
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individualized assessments of religious conduct,81 and this principle is also 
important to courts determining whether it is possible to enforce a marital 
agreement that originates in a religious setting.82     
Some courts apply a higher level of scrutiny to cases involving so-called 
hybrid rights, when a free exercise claim relates to another area protected by 
the Constitution.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the religious freedom claim was 
recognized in combination with the fundamental right of parents to make 
important decisions regarding their children’s upbringing.83  Similarly, laws 
that appeared to be neutral and generally applicable, but which undermined 
the fundamental right to marry on religious grounds might fall within the 
scope of Yoder. These principles are less likely to be useful in custody or 
other disputes between parents, where the court cannot decide between 
religious views or prefer one parent’s religion over the other’s.84 
Walking a fine line between the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses, state courts have sometimes considered religion as a factor deciding 
custody disputes, particularly when there is evidence of the child’s religious 
beliefs and needs,85 or evidence that a parent’s religiously motivated 
practices have had a negative effect on the child’s best interests.86  Without 
this sort of evidence, however, courts are clear that parental responsibility 
issues may not be determined on the basis of religious considerations.87 
Similarly, in the context of divorce, state courts cannot favor one point 
of view when two spouses may have different religious views regarding 
divorce.88  If members of a couple disagree over whether to cooperate in 
 
 81.  See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882–84 (discussing claims for unemployment compensation after 
discharge). 
 82.  E.g., Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Shaban v. Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 863 (Ct. App. 2001); Mayer-Kolker v. Kolker, 819 A.2d 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003). 
 83.  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 84.  E.g., Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. 1997); Sagar v. Sagar, 781 N.E.2d 54 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2003). 
 85.  Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233 (Alaska 1979). 
 86.  Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228. 
 87.  E.g., Harrison v. Tauheed, 256 P.3d 851 (Kan. 2011); Katz v. Katz, 966 N.Y.S.2d 346 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 2013), Shepp v. Shepp, 906 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 2006); see also Jeffrey Shulman, What Yoder 
Wrought: Religious Disparagement, Parental Alienation and the Best Interests of the Child, 53 
VILL. L. REV. 173 (2008). 
 88.  See Sharma v. Sharma, 667 P.2d 395 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Wikoski v. Wikoski, 513 A.2d 
986 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); Waite v. Waite, 150 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004); Trickey v. 
Trickey, 642 S.W.2d 47 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). 
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religious proceedings or rituals to terminate their marriage, the state courts 
cannot order the recalcitrant member to participate.89  This presents a 
particularly significant problem for observant Jewish women, who are 
unable to marry again without a get, or religious divorce.90  The structural 
differences between the positions of husbands and wives, under religious 
law, create opportunities for strategic or abusive conduct that carries over 
into secular divorce proceedings.91  Understanding that secular courts cannot 
address this issue directly, significant creativity has been brought to the 
effort to find a solution to the problem.92  Jewish communities have come up 
with two significant responses: efforts to have legislatures enact get laws as 
a device to coordinate secular and religious divorce proceedings,93 and the 
use of arbitration agreements to confer authority on a religious tribunal.94 
In practice, New York’s get laws have prompted a cooperative process 
between the rabbinic arbitration tribunals and the civil courts that has 
benefitted women who wish to harmonize their civil and religious family 
status.95  The process has helped to reduce the opportunities for strategic 
 
 89.  See Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d 899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993); Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996).  But see Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 579 (stating that 
“courts have relied on contract theories as a basis for ordering a recalcitrant spouse to appear before 
the bet din to deliver or accept a get”). 
 90.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86; see also Michael J. Broyde, New York’s 
Regulation of Jewish Marriage: Covenant, Contract, or Statute?, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A 
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND 
RELIGION, supra note 7, at 138. 
 91.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86. 
 92.  See id.; Unofficial Family Law, supra note 2, at 470–72. 
 93.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86.  In the debate over multicultural 
accommodation, get laws represent the opposite end of the spectrum from the new foreign law bans.  
See id.  In the United States, New York is the only state with get legislation.  See id.; see also N.Y. 
DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(h), (B)(6)(d) (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 3) 
(enacted 1962); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney, Westlaw through L.2014, chapters 1 to 3) 
(enacted 1983); Broyde, supra note 90, at 148–61.  Get legislation was enacted in the United 
Kingdom in 2002. See Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002, c. 27 (Eng.).  See also Embracing 
Tradition, supra note 3, at 581 n.257 
 94.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86.  Arbitration agreements may also prove 
useful for Muslim communities.  See id. at 575–77; see also Mohammad H. Fadel, Political 
Liberalism, Islamic Family Law, and Family Law Pluralism, in MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN A 
MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT: MULTI-TIERED MARRIAGE AND THE BOUNDARIES OF CIVIL LAW AND 
RELIGION, supra note 7, at 164, 193–96; cf. Broyde, supra note 90, at 154 n.67 (noting the question 
of whether New York’s get statute might apply to Islamic marriages (citations omitted)). 
 95.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 582–83; see also Broyde, supra note 90. 
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behavior between individuals who both intend to remain within the religious 
community.96  If one member of a couple left the community and objected to 
the procedure—and the statute—on First Amendment grounds, it could face 
a serious establishment and free exercise challenge.97  Beyond New York, 
where there are no get laws, state courts rely on the neutral principles of 
contract and arbitration law to review agreements to arbitrate before 
religious tribunals, as well as the outcomes of those proceedings.98  In this 
context, courts also recognize clearly the constraints under the First 
Amendment on this review process.99 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For international family law cases—including those in which a foreign 
court applied Islamic or Jewish law—the ordinary comity framework 
incorporates important protections established by constitutional law and 
public policy.  In domestic cases, neutral principles of contract and 
arbitration law work reasonably well for couples and families who anticipate 
and plan for private ordering and dispute resolution in a religious law 
framework.100  While it is clear that American courts must avoid direct 
interpretation or application of religious law, the traditional approach to both 
comity and contract do not require state courts to reject a judgment or 
agreement based on different substantive laws.  This is precisely the point of 
both the comity doctrine and the move toward greater private ordering in 
family law. 
 The biggest challenge, both conceptually and practically, comes in 
transnational cases involving families with ties to multiple countries and 
legal systems over time.  For example, consider a couple who marry abroad 
and relocate to the United States.101  How much of the legal system from the 
country where they were married should follow them to the United States, 
 
 96.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 583. 
 97.  Cf. In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1025–26 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (Johnson, J., 
dissenting); Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 579–80. 
 98.  See Embracing Tradition, supra note 3, at 578–86. 
 99.  E.g., Lang v. Levi, 16 A.3d 980 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2011). 
 100.  See Broyde, supra note 90, at 147–48 (noting that couples may not anticipate and plan ahead 
for these problems at the time of their marriage). 
 101.  E.g., Shaban v. Shaban, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 863 (Ct. App. 2001). 
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and for how long?  How can a court determine whether they intended to be 
governed in the future by the law under which they were married, rather than 
the law of the place where they have relocated? How far should husband or 
wife be permitted to forum shop by moving between the couple’s country of 
origin and the place where they have established domicile, residence, or 
citizenship?  What if the reason for seeking a religious divorce in the United 
States is to assure that their status will be recognized, if one or both of them 
return to their home country?102 
There are similar challenges in cases involving families who are 
“transnational” in the sense that they span different countries and legal 
systems in a single moment in time.  For example, a husband and father may 
relocate to the United States, and choose not to bring his wife and 
children.103  Or a family may try living in the United States together, and 
some family members may decide to return to their original home country.  
Or a wife may come to the United States and seek the benefit of more 
generous family law rules.104  What laws should be applied to the family 
disputes that follow? How quickly should our laws and policies begin to 
override those of the country where the family began? Should the family 
members living abroad have the same opportunity to forum shop between 
the two legal systems as the family members living in the United States?105  
These problems extend beyond the realm of family law. We have begun 
to recognize that failure to protect family members from serious domestic 
violence is a type of persecution that may be a basis for refugee status. 
Should foreign citizens be able to seek asylum on the basis of foreign laws 
that define important family status or legal rights on the basis of gender or 
legitimacy of birth? 
In these circumstances, we have moved beyond the law of comity and 
the ordinary framework of contract law.  Courts are understandably reluctant 
to treat the comity doctrine or a marital agreement like a permanent forum 
selection choice of law trump card. The questions in these cases are also not 
 
 102.  Cf. MACFARLANE, supra note 2, at 227–31 (noting particular difficulties surrounding 
divorce for Muslim families in transnational cases).  As Mohammad Fadel notes, a judgment from 
an Islamic court is necessary to establish a divorced woman’s legal and moral entitlements within 
the Muslim community.  Fadel, supra note 94, at 191. 
 103.  E.g., Chaudry v. Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978). 
 104.  E.g., Hosain v. Malik, 671 A.2d 988 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1996). 
 105.  E.g., Amin v. Bakhaty, 798 So.2d 75, 84-85 (La. 2001). 
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constitutional, except in the broader sense of how we understand the process 
by which people become members of our political and legal community. 
This may suggest a more sympathetic double reading of the recent strain of 
foreign law statutes as legally misguided and problematic on one hand, and 
on the other as a strong and affirmative statement of the desire to embrace 
and include all families present within our borders in the broader legal 
institutions that shape and define our society.  
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